Trade costs are known to be a major obstacle to international economic integration. Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, this paper explores the e¤ects of international trade costs in a micro-founded general equilibrium model that also allows for pricing to market. Trade costs are shown to create an endogenous home bias in consumption and reduce cross-country consumption correlations. In addition, trade costs magnify exchange rate volatility in response to monetary shocks and typically turn a monetary expansion into a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. It is striking that trade costs generally lead to these results both under producer and local currency pricing.
Introduction
Trade costs have long been known as a major obstacle to international economic integration. In a recent survey, James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2004) show that empirical trade costs are large even when formal barriers to trade do not exist. They argue that the tari¤ equivalent of representative international trade costs is around 74%. This paper puts trade costs in the spotlight by integrating them into a rigorous micro-founded general equilibrium model. The central focus of the paper is to explore their theoretical e¤ects on cross-country consumption correlations, exchange rate volatility and welfare.
Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, the paper demonstrates that even moderate international trade costs can substantially tone down the cross-country correlation of consumption. Trade costs are therefore likely to play an important role in explaining the consumption correlations puzzle. In addition, trade costs magnify exchange rate volatility in the face of monetary shocks, and for realistic parameter values they convert a monetary expansion into a beggar-thy-neighbor policy for welfare. An overarching result of the paper is that all these e¤ects generally arise under both producer and local currency pricing. The …ndings therefore have the potential to apply to a wide range of modeling frameworks because they do not crucially depend on the degree of pricing to market.
Intuitively, by raising the price of imported goods trade costs render domestic goods more attractive to consumers. As a consequence, spending is predominantly kept within the domestic country and consumption is tilted towards domestic goods, creating an endogenous home bias in consumption. This containment e¤ ect of trade costs tends to isolate two countries from each other and makes them behave more like closed economies. Shocks hitting one country therefore have a reduced bearing on the other, weakening current account movements and the international correlations of consumption and output. As a result of the containment e¤ect, trade costs also prevent a domestic monetary expansion from su¢ ciently stimulating demand for foreign goods.
For a wide range of realistic parameter values they therefore lead to negative welfare spillovers.
The e¤ect of trade costs is generally biggest when the two countries are of equal size. Intuitively, in that case the volume of trade ‡ows is largest and trade costs are most detrimental.
Interestingly, the impact of trade costs is nonlinear such that small magnitudes are su¢ cient to create a sizeable e¤ect.
The model of my paper falls into the tradition of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature that has evolved from Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogo¤'s (1995) seminal contribution. It represents a micro-founded two-country general equilibrium framework with monopolistic competition and one-period price stickiness. The key contribution of my paper is to combine this set-up with iceberg trade costs as the central modeling device. As a consequence of trade costs, many conclusions from Obstfeld and Rogo¤'s (1995) paper no longer hold, for example consumption is no longer highly correlated across countries and a monetary expansion no longer leads to positive welfare spillovers.
In addition, I adopt the pricing-to-market extension by Caroline Betts and Michael Devereux (2000) to allow for local currency pricing. Betts and Devereux (2000) show that local currency pricing reduces consumption correlations and leads to negative welfare spillovers. My paper generalizes this …nding by demonstrating that local currency pricing is not necessary to obtain these results. In fact, trade costs generally reduce consumption correlations and lead to negative welfare spillovers for any degree of pricing to market. Moreover, as discussed by Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein (2006) , trade costs are a plausible cause of market segmentation and thus provide a good motivation for local currency pricing and deviations from the law of one price.
Paul Krugman (1980) is the …rst author to introduce iceberg trade costs into a monopolistic competition framework but he focuses on trade and increasing returns and does not model money nor the exchange rate. John Fender and Chong Yip (2000) consider a unilateral tari¤ but not symmetric trade costs. Ravn and Mazzenga (2004) evaluate the e¤ect of transportation costs in a real business cycle approach. Apart from the ‡exible-price environment their paper is di¤erent by assuming a home bias in preferences. The latter assumption is also made by Francis Warnock (2003) , whereas in my paper preferences are deliberately not biased. Unbiased preferences are supported by micro-evidence from Carolyn Evans (2001) and in combination with trade costs, they give rise to an endogenous home bias in consumption.
My model is closely related in spirit to the paper by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) . They have given trade costs new impetus by pointing out their potential to elucidate major puzzles of international macroeconomics like the consumption correlations puzzle. But Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) only use a small open endowment economy model, as do Paul Bergin and Reuven Glick (2006) who introduce heterogeneous iceberg trade costs and endogenous tradability. Allan Brunner and Kanda Naknoi (2003) integrate trade costs into a more rigorous two-country general equilibrium model with production, assuming full pass-through of the exchange rate.
Generalizing this framework even further, my paper allows for less than full pass-through, shows that trade costs reduce consumption correlations across countries and also conducts a welfare analysis. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the e¤ects of trade costs are typically most pronounced when two countries are of equal size. Intuitively, when two countries are equally big, the overall reliance on trade is largest and the impact of trade costs is felt most strongly.
The inclusion of trade costs yields results that are in some respects similar to the ones obtained by David Backus and Gregor Smith (1993) and Harald Hau (2000) in their models with nontradable goods. Hau (2000) also …nds that consumption becomes less correlated across countries and that both nominal and real exchange rates are more volatile in the presence of monetary shocks. But my paper obtains these results with tradable goods only. The abstraction from nontradable goods is motivated by empirical evidence by Charles Engel (1999) and V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan (2002) , showing that the relative price of nontradable goods accounts for virtually none of U.S. and European real exchange rate movements. Instead, the real exchange rate appears to be driven almost exclusively by the relative price of tradable goods.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces trade costs into a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model with sticky prices. Section 3 describes its ‡exible-price equilibrium, establishing the endogenous home bias in consumption. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of monetary shocks under sticky prices with particular focus on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates. It also presents simulation results, showing that moderate values of trade costs can lead to substantial reductions in cross-country consumption correlations. In Section 5 I conduct a welfare analysis with the result that a monetary expansion is typically a beggar-thy-neighbor policy in the presence of trade costs. Section 6 concludes.
A Model with Trade Costs
The model follows the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature and is based on the pricing-to-market setting in Betts and Devereux (2000) . As a new ingredient there exist exogenous 'iceberg' trade costs , where represents the fraction of goods that melts away during the trading process with 0 < 1. If = 0 we have the special case of frictionless trade that is customary in the literature. In the extreme case of ! 1, trade between the two countries breaks down and they become closed economies.
Households choose among a continuum [0; 1] of di¤erentiated, nondurable and tradable goods which are produced by monopolistic …rms. The sizes of the Home and Foreign countries are n and 1 n with 0 < n < 1. As in Betts and Devereux (2000) , it is assumed that s with 0 s 1 is the fraction of …rms in each country that engage in pricing to market (PTM) and that can price-discriminate across the two countries because households cannot arbitrage away potential cross-country price di¤erences. If s = 0 all …rms set prices in producer currency, if s = 1 all …rms set prices in local currency.
Households
Households derive utility from consumption C t and also from real money balances M t =P t due to a transactionary motive but they dislike work h t . In Home country notation utility is given by
with the composite consumption index de…ned as
where is the elasticity of substitution with > 1, c it is consumption of good i at time t, is the subjective discount factor with 0 < < 1, M t is the money supply and h t represents labor. The parameters , , , and are positive and identical across countries. All above variables C t and h t etc. are Home per-capita variables. Since all households within one country are identical by construction, the corresponding Home aggregate quantities are nC t and nh t etc.
Note that unlike in Warnock (2003) there is no home bias in preferences.
The Home consumption-based price index is de…ned as the minimum expenditure subject to C t = 1 and can be derived as 1
The Foreign price index is given by
where prices p represent Home currency goods prices and prices q represent Foreign currency goods prices. In general, asterisks indicate Foreign country variables but in the context of goods prices an asterisk means that a price is set by a Foreign …rm. Thus, all p it are set by Foreign …rms in Home currency and all q it are set by Foreign …rms in Foreign currency.
The goods in the range [0; n] are produced by Home …rms and the goods in the range [n; 1]
are produced by Foreign …rms. In the Home price index (3), Foreign …rms price to market for the goods in the range [n; n + (1 n)s], i.e. they set the corresponding prices p it in Home currency. The range [n + (1 n)s; 1] represents the goods produced by Foreign …rms that do not price to market and therefore set prices q it in Foreign currency. These are converted into Home currency through multiplying by the nominal exchange rate e t , which is de…ned as the Home price of Foreign currency.
Note that the factor Asset markets are complete domestically such that each household owns an equal share of an initial stock of domestic currency and an equal share of all domestic …rms. There is no bond denominated in Foreign currency but there is free and costless trade in a Home currency nominal discount bond. F t represents the Home holdings of the bond maturing in period t + 1 and d t is its price. The Home budget constraint at time t in per-capita terms is thus given by
where W t is the nominal wage rate, t are Home …rms' pro…ts and Z t are nominal lump-sum transfers from the Home government.
The Home consumption demand function can be derived as
where it = 8 > < > :
analogous to the three terms in price index (3).
Government
Let the composite government consumption index G t be de…ned like the private one in (2). Government demand is then analogous to private demand. The Home government budget constraint is
If the Home government generates revenue from printing money, it can either consume goods or
give out nominal lump-sum transfers to its citizens, in which case Z t > 0. The same holds for the Foreign government budget constraint.
Firms
Each …rm faces the same linear production technology
where y t denotes Home per-capita output and h t is Home per-capita labor input. Note that the i subscript is dropped as all …rms face the same production technology. Home output can be divided into output destined for the domestic country, denoted by x t , and output destined for the Foreign country, denoted by z t
Labor markets in each country are perfectly competitive so that the internationally immobile workers are wage-takers. The Home per-capita pro…t function for any s 2 [0; 1] is then given by
Note that (11) is expressed in f.o.b. terms and that z t is the amount of Home output that is shipped to Foreign. Due to trade costs only the fraction (1 ) of z t arrives and is consumed in Foreign. The …rst term on the right-hand side of (11) re ‡ects the revenue of …rms that engage in pricing to market and charge the Foreign currency price q t to Foreign consumers. The second term is the revenue from non-pricing-to-market …rms, which always charge the Home currency price p t . The last term of (11) constitutes the costs of production.
As the demand elasticities are equal in both countries, it follows
Conditions (12) and (13) 
and for Foreign …rms
3 The Flexible-Price Equilibrium
The question of interest in this section is how trade costs a¤ect the ‡exible-price equilibrium compared to a perfect, frictionless world. As usual in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, it is assumed that …rms set prices after the exchange rate and wages are known and that initially there are neither bond holdings, government consumption nor lump-sum transfers
The time index t is dropped to denote initial equilibrium values.
An Endogenous Home Bias in Consumption
By comparing individual goods prices in (7) one can easily see that trade costs drive up the price of imported goods and thus render domestic goods more attractive. As a result, consumers spend a bigger fraction of their income on domestic goods. This bu¤ering feature of trade costs will be referred to as the containment e¤ ect of trade costs, meaning that spending tends to be retained within the domestic country. Trade costs therefore lead to an endogenous home bias in consumption in each country. 3
The home bias arises although the preference speci…cation in (2) is symmetric such that consumers equally desire all goods, regardless of where they are produced. Of course, abandoning the symmetry by introducing an exogenous home bias in preferences, for example as in Warnock (2003), would be an alternative way of explaining the home bias. However, Carolyn Evans (2001) …nds empirically that the only signi…cant reason for the tendency of consumers to purchase domestic goods are locational factors arising due to geographic distance and legal regulations -but not consumer preferences. 4 Her …ndings are therefore consistent with the preference speci…cation in (2) and the model's iceberg trade costs but not with Warnock's (2003) assumption of home bias in preferences.
A Numerical Example
As shown in Appendix B, equilibrium labor supply is not a¤ected by trade costs because of the logarithmic utility speci…cation in (1). However, trade costs reduce consumption, real pro…ts and real wages and hence, they make individuals worse o¤. 5 Figure 1 illustrates this reduction with a numerical example that will be used again in subsequent sections. In order to remain close to the existing literature, the parameter values are the same as in Betts and Devereux (2000) who give a detailed empirical motivation for their chosen magnitudes. As the price markup in (14) and (15) In the same vein, if the countries are not of equal size, absolute PPP will no longer hold in equilibrium because the two countries are asymmetrically a¤ected by trade costs. That is, the equilibrium real exchange rate eP =P will be below 1 if the Home country is smaller and vice versa (see Appendix B). In contrast, in a model without trade costs the law of one price on the individual goods level inevitably leads to absolute PPP irrespective of country size.
Sticky Prices and Shocks
This section examines how key economic variables respond to shocks when trade costs impede the international exchange of goods and when prices are sticky for one period. The discussion concentrates on the real and nominal exchange rates, consumption, output and the current account. Full analytical derivations are given in Appendix C.
As a Keynesian feature of the model, it is now assumed that all prices (p t , p t , q t , q t ) are preset every period and that …rms choose prices to be optimal in the absence of shocks. They therefore preset the prices of the initial ‡exible-price equilibrium. For a su¢ ciently small shock in period t, …rms have an incentive to produce the post-shock market demand since they are monopolistic competitors and still make pro…ts. As there is no capital in the model, prices and all other variables reach their new long-run equilibrium in t + 1, just one period after the shock hits the economy. Log-linear approximations are taken around the pre-shock ‡exible-price equilibrium of Section 3. For any variable X let b X t+k (X t+k X)=X be the percentage deviation from the initial equilibrium at time t + k for k = 0; 1 caused by either a monetary shock or a government spending shock. The following discussion concentrates on monetary shocks and an analysis of government spending shocks is provided in Appendix C.3.
Price Indices and the Real Exchange Rate
The short-run responses of the price indices to an exchange rate movement in period t can be obtained by log-linearizing (3) and (4). Under full pricing to market (s = 1) the price indices are not a¤ected by nominal exchange rate movements since all prices are …xed in local currency irrespective of trade costs ( b P t = b P t = 0). A nominal exchange rate depreciation therefore directly translates into a real exchange rate depreciation (
But if at least some prices are sticky in producer currency (0 s < 1), exchange rate movements do feed into the price indices such that a depreciation of the Home currency will increase the Home price level and decrease the Foreign price level. In this context trade costs weaken the e¤ect that exchange rate movements have on price indices. 7 Intuitively, trade costs act like bu¤ers that shift consumption towards domestic goods through their containment e¤ect and thus decrease the weight of imported goods and exchange rates in the price index. In This weakening e¤ect of trade costs has consequences for the real exchange rate movement which can be expressed as
where is a function of trade costs and exogenous parameters only. has the property that = 0 for = 0 and that it monotonically increases in such that 0 < < 1 for 0 < < 1. 8
Let us analyze the case of producer currency pricing (s = 0) and a depreciation (b e t > 0). In the absence of trade costs ( = = 0) the price index movements are exactly o¤set by the nominal exchange rate so that the real exchange rate does not move at all ( b t = 0). But in the presence of trade costs the price index movements are weakened and the real exchange rate is no longer …xed ( b t > 0). The real exchange rate movement is stronger for higher trade costs with b t = b e t in the limit as ! 1. 9
Real exchange rate movements under producer currency pricing therefore approach the ones under local currency pricing for increasing trade costs. the numerical example from Section 3.2. Figure 3 and all subsequent …gures are drawn for onepercent shocks. Note that the impact of trade costs is greatest for the symmetric case of n = 0:5.
Intuitively, when the two countries are of equal size, the volume of trade ‡ows is biggest and trade costs are most detrimental. As shown in Appendix C, the expression for nominal exchange rate overshooting (b e t b e t+1 ) is proportional to the real exchange rate movement (16). In the presence of trade costs overshooting therefore even occurs under producer currency pricing and overshooting is biggest when the two countries are of equal size.
The Nominal Exchange Rate, Consumption, Output and the Current Account
One can express the nominal exchange rate movement in period t in terms of exogenous shocks and parameters as
where
with 1 < < . 0 depends on trade costs and country size n (see Appendix C). Since The results can be understood with the help of two 'switching' e¤ects. Under local currency pricing (s = 1) relative prices and thus relative demand are …xed, but measured in domestic currency Home …rms generate higher revenue because of the exchange rate depreciation. This will be referred to as the income-switching e¤ ect. As a result of the containment e¤ect this Table 1 A monetary shock and the impact of trade costs ( c
additional income is predominantly spent on domestic goods, leading to a higher increase in Home output and a lower increase in Foreign output ( b h t > b h t ). But in the absence of trade costs the additional income would be spent evenly across the two countries ( b h t = b h t ). Apart from output trade costs do not a¤ect the reaction of other variables to the monetary shock.
In particular, as can be seen from (17) the nominal exchange rate does not behave di¤erently because the ratio a 1 =a 5 is independent of trade costs.
In contrast, when a monetary shock hits the economy under producer currency pricing (s = 0), price indices are no longer …xed and the familiar expenditure-switching e¤ ect comes into play. The price indices thus take on some of the adjustment process. But as trade costs hamper the movement of price indices and therefore erode the expenditure-switching e¤ect, the nominal exchange rate must depreciate more strongly than it would without trade costs. 10 Figure 4 illustrates with the numerical example of Section 3.2 that when trade costs increase, the exchange rate movement approaches the one under local currency pricing. In that case it is most pronounced because there is no expenditure-switching e¤ect at all. Again, the impact of trade costs is biggest when the two countries are of equal size.
The erosion of the expenditure-switching e¤ect also manifests itself in the output reactions.
As Table 1 
Simulation Results
Two conclusions follow from the results that have been discussed so far. First, trade costs make both nominal and real exchange rates more volatile. Second, trade costs reduce international consumption correlations and increase output correlations for most degrees of pricing to market.
These two conclusions are illustrated by simulation results in Figures 5-7 . Each simulated observation is constructed from 100 replications over a draw of 100 periods for uncorrelated shocks to M t and M t . The underlying parameter values are the same as in Betts and Devereux (2000) and the numerical example of Section 3.2. 12 Note that the trade cost value is chosen as = 0:25 as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) , which is moderate compared to Anderson and van Wincoop's (2004) empirical estimate of = 0:43. 6 The simulation results can therefore be regarded as a conservative benchmark for the e¤ects of trade costs. Figure 5 plots the volatility of the nominal and real exchange rates against the degree of pricing 1 1 Devereux (2000) provides a detailed discussion of the impact on the current account. 1 2 = 11, = 1, = 0:94, = 10=11, n = 0:5. to market s. Volatility is measured as the relative variance of exchange rate movements and
Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
For s = 0 the volatility of the nominal exchange rate goes up by over 50 percent (from 0:56 to 0:86) and the real exchange rate is no longer …xed. Thus, especially for low degrees of pricing to market trade costs can signi…cantly increase the volatility of exchange rates.
International Consumption and Output Correlations
Empirically, output is more strongly correlated across countries than consumption. 13 However, the literature on international business cycles has struggled to explain this phenomenon known as the "consumption correlations puzzle"(for a discussion see Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000) . Figure 6 visualizes the international correlations of consumption growth and output growth, Corr( b
and Corr( b h t ; b h t ), that arise in the presence of trade costs. Unless s = 1 trade costs enormously reduce consumption correlations. For producer currency pricing (s = 0) they reduce it by over 80 percent (from 0:88 to 0:11). Unless s is big, trade costs increase output correlations. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) cannot generate low cross-country consumption correlations even if they introduce transportation costs as a trading friction into their real business cycle model (also see Ravn and Mazzenga, 2004) . Instead, sticky prices in combination with demand shocks seem to be key ingredients to generate more realistic cross-country correlations. Indeed, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) use sticky prices in combination with monetary shocks and local currency pricing (s = 1) to bring down consumption correlations, and by introducing investment and capital they also yield more realistic output correlations. My paper demonstrates that in the presence of trade costs local currency pricing is not required to obtain more realistic international correlations because trade costs reduce consumption correlations even for low degrees of pricing to market. It therefore seems promising for future work to integrate trade costs into a sticky-price model that allows for capital accumulation.
Rebating Trade Costs
So far iceberg trade costs have been treated as a black hole in the model. Although a certain dead-weight loss is conceivable in the form of red tape and language barriers, some sectors in the economy are likely to absorb trade costs, for instance transportation companies. In this vein a recent strand of literature has incorporated a distribution sector into trade models, for instance Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) . 14 As Appendix D shows, all the results that have been discussed in previous sections are qualitatively the same when trade costs are rebated. It is assumed that by holding a monopoly on the shipping of goods into the domestic country, governments are able to recuperate trade costs and then rebate them to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, a set-up which is comparable to an import tari¤ and a lump-sum transfer of the tari¤ revenue. Intuitively, the results are robust to a rebate because the relative price of imported over domestically produced goods is not a¤ected. The containment e¤ect of trade costs therefore still applies.
Trade Costs and Welfare
How do trade costs a¤ect the welfare properties of monetary and government spending shocks?
To address this issue, we adopt Obstfeld and Rogo¤'s (1995) methodology and decompose the utility function (1) into U t = U R t + U M t where U R t consists of the consumption and labor terms and U M t of real money balances. As Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) argue, unless real money balances are assigned an implausibly large weight in (1), U R t dominates the overall welfare Table 2 The impact of trade costs on welfare
e¤ect of a shock and U M t can be neglected. Taking log-linear approximation and noting that C t+1 = C t+1+k as well as h t+1 = h t+1+k for k = 1, 2... yields
The notation for the Foreign country is analogous. < 0) because they have to work harder in the short run, whereas Home citizens are better o¤ ( d U R t > 0). Since trade costs tone down the labor supply response to the shock, they also tone down the welfare response and thus, as shown in Figure 8 , the welfare gap between Home and Foreign citizens shrinks.
Under producer currency pricing (s = 0), however, trade costs lead to a qualitative change in the welfare response. The containment e¤ect ensures that the positive stimulus of a Home monetary expansion can be for the most part retained in the domestic economy. For su¢ ciently large trade costs, a monetary expansion therefore becomes a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Figure   9 illustrates the welfare response under producer currency pricing. Only in the limit when the two countries become closed economies ( ! 1) are Foreign citizens not a¤ected by a Home shock.
To summarize, in the presence of trade costs a monetary expansion typically triggers a negative welfare spillover regardless of the degree of pricing to market, a …nding which is also pointed out by Warnock (2003) for a home bias in preferences and which could also arise with nontradable goods. For intermediate degrees of pricing to market (0 < s < 1) welfare gains can therefore be expected from the international coordination of monetary policy (see Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005) . The …nding of a negative welfare spillover stands in sharp contrast to Obstfeld and Rogo¤'s (1995) result that in a frictionless world with producer currency pricing, monetary shocks entail positive and symmetric international welfare spillovers. Finally, the model is also combined with pricing to market in order to allow for both producer and local currency pricing. A general insight from this set-up is that trade costs typically lead to the same qualitative e¤ects under both producer and local currency pricing. The …ndings therefore have the potential to apply to a wide range of modeling frameworks because they do not crucially depend on the degree of pricing to market. 
A Households and Firms
Appendix A outlines the derivations of the expressions in Section 2. Demand function (6) is derived by maximizing C t in (2) subject to the expenditure given by
This also results in price index (3). Maximizing utility (1) subject to the two-period intertemporal budget constraint constructed from (5)
yields the optimality condition for labor supply
and the money demand function
as well as the intertemporal consumption stream
The corresponding equations for the Foreign country are analogous.
Let us now turn to pro…t maximization. For the …rms' price markups note that with the nominal anchor (12) the pro…t function (11) simpli…es to
From (6) insert the demand functions
Then maximize with respect to p t to yield (14) . (15) can be analogously computed for the Foreign country.
In order to derive the relative wage W t =(e t W t ) consistent with (12)- (15) initially impose that W t =(e t W t ) = . Then plug this into the price indices (3) and (4), also using the markups (14) and (15). This results in the real wages
Then insert (22) and (23) into (10), again using W t =(e t W t ) = and the real wages (24) and (25). Some algebra veri…es that W t =(e t W t ) = holds with = ( = ) 1 2 1 . and consist of exogenous parameters only. and cannot be solved analytically but by repeated substitution they always converge to one unique value for all admissible parameters. For = 0 it follows = = 1, and for 0 < < 1 it follows n < < 1 and (1 n) < < 1.
B The Flexible-Price Equilibrium
Appendix B gives the derivations and analytical results of Section 3. In equilibrium the percapita supply of labor and thus per-capita output is the same in both countries
(28) can be derived by combining (5), (9), (10), (11), (14) and (19), noting that in the initial
The equilibrium real wages are given in (24) and (25). Plugging (11) and (24) into (28) yields Home real pro…ts
Foreign real pro…ts can be derived similarly as
By inserting (24) and (28) into (19) Home consumption can be derived as
Similarly, Foreign consumption follows as
The nominal exchange rate is obtained by plugging (24) and (25) into W t =(e t W t ) = with with = ( = ) 1 2 1 from Appendix A and then using (20) and its Foreign equivalent
The real exchange rate can be straightforwardly expressed as
Note that real wages in (24) and (25), real pro…ts in (29) and (30) and consumption in (31) and (32) are reduced by trade costs since @ =@ < 0 and @ =@ < 0 (also see Figure 1 ).
Relative quantities can be expressed as
If > 0, for n = 1 n = 0:5 it follows = from (26) and (27), whereas for n > 1 n it follows > and vice versa. Thus, in the presence of trade costs a smaller country faces lower consumption, a lower real wage and lower real pro…ts (see Figure 2 ).
C Sticky Prices and Shocks
Appendix C outlines the derivations of the expressions in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
C.1 Price Indices and the Real Exchange Rate
The short-run movements of the price indices are given by
For a given nominal depreciation of the Home currency the behavior of the price indices can be summarized as
The parameter in (16) is de…ned as n + (1 n) 1 with = 0 for = 0 and 0 < < 1 for 0 < < 1. The nominal exchange rate overshooting equation can be expressed as
The usual necessary condition for overshooting is > 1, i.e. that the consumption elasticity of money demand (1= ) is smaller than one.
C.2 The Nominal Exchange Rate, Consumption, Output and the Current Account
The derivation of the exchange rate movement (17) is sketched …rst. Noting that F t 1 = 0 by assumption, combine (5), (8) and (11) to get the overall Home budget constraint
represent goods market clearing conditions. Analogously, for the Foreign country
where F t represents Foreign holdings of the bond maturing in period t + 1 and
Take log-linear approximations and combine these equations. Note that by using (40)- (42), (44)- (46), z P T M = z N P T M = z and z P T M = z N P T M = z as well as (34) and (35) one …nds that in the initial equilibrium x=y = n , z=y = 1 n , x =y = 1 n , z =y = 1 1 n . Subtract the approximation of (43) from the approximation of (39), using d F t = n 1 n d F t , d = , CP = py = eC P = eq y where = ( = ) 1 2 1 from above. Also use (36) and (37). The resulting equation is
Approximations of long-run market clearing and optimality conditions are required in order to express the current term d F t in (47) as dependent on exogenous variables. The following equations need to be log-linearized and combined
Note that (12) and (13) also hold at time t + 1. Also note that d
(52) and (55) are the households' optimal labor supply decisions combined with the long-run versions of markups (14) and (15). As a result one yields
Now make use of the intertemporal Euler equation (21) and its Foreign equivalent in order to (34) and also using (36) and (37). Combine this result with the money market clearing condition (20) and its Foreign equivalent to yield
From (33) note that
and recall the assumption of permanent monetary shocks ( c
bine (47) and (56)- (59) to obtain (17). Then combining (17), (47), (56) and (57) In contrast to (56) b C t+1 and b C t+1 as the long-run consumption movements can also be expressed separately with the help of the log-linear approximations of (48)- (55) as
The current account term d F t showing up in (56), (60) and (61) can be expressed as dependent on exogenous variables by using (56)- (59) (
where b e t is given in (17).
The long-run output movements also follow from the log-linearizations of (48)- (55) as
The short-run consumption movements can be derived by log-linearizing and combining (20) and its Foreign equivalent, both for periods t and t+1, as well as (21) and its Foreign equivalent, resulting in
where b X w t+k n b X t+k + (1 n) b X t+k for k = 0; 1. b P w t can be replaced by exogenous variables via (17), (36) and (37). Then b C t and b C t can be computed as
where ( b C t b C t ) follows from combining (17), (56), (57) and (62). In the presence of monetary shocks only the consumption movements are given by
In the special case of s = 1 and a Home monetary shock the consumption movements follow as
In the presence of government spending shocks only they are given by
Finally, the short-run output movements b h t and b h t can be derived as follows. Note that
Log-linearize these two equations using (40)- (42) and (44)- (46). The results are
C t and b e t are given in (36), (37), (63)- (66) and (17). In the special case of s = 1 and a Home monetary shock the output movements follow as
In the special case of s = 1 and a Home temporary government spending shock they follow as
C.3 Government spending shocks
Let us turn to Home government spending shocks. There are two types -a temporary shock
. 15 If the government unexpectedly increases its spending without simultaneously printing money, it receives lump-sum transfers from its citizens (Z t < 0) to …nance its expenditures. An exchange rate depreciation helps Home citizens to generate this lump-sum transfer because it creates additional income. 16 A permanent government spending shock generally leads to a bigger exchange rate depreciation than a temporary one because the government maintains its level of spending for all future periods. 17 Tables 3 and 4 summarize the e¤ects of the two types of shocks.
The di¤erence to a monetary shock is that a government spending shock does not only set o¤ an exchange rate movement, which entails an income-switching e¤ect in the case of full pricing to market and an expenditure-switching e¤ect in case of producer currency pricing, but it is also a direct source of additional spending. The following results generally depend on parameter values but hold for a broad range of realistic magnitudes including the ones chosen in Section Table 3 A temporary government spending shock and the impact of trade costs
Holds for realistic parameter values (see Section 3.2). Table 4 A permanent government spending shock and the impact of trade costs 
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As described in the context of monetary shocks, under local currency pricing (s = 1) the impact of the mere income-switching e¤ect on the exchange rate is not a¤ected by trade costs.
But as a new element, additional spending comes into play with government spending shocks.
Since the containment e¤ect ensures that a bigger fraction of the government spending is kept in the domestic country, Home citizens are less pressured to generate additional income in order to …nance their government's spending. Hence, in total, under local currency pricing the ensuing exchange rate movement is less pronounced both with temporary and permanent government spending shocks. 19 Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the exchange rate movements for s = 1 and varying trade cost values.
As before with monetary shocks, under local currency pricing the containment e¤ect leads to a stronger increase in Home production ( b h t > b h t ). But now Home citizens incur a current account de…cit ( d F t < 0) because they borrow in order to smooth their consumption whilst …nancing their government's spending. Again, trade costs tone down the current account de…cit and all long-run movements, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4. We already know from the analysis of monetary shocks that under producer currency pricing (s = 0) trade costs erode the expenditure-switching e¤ect so that the exchange rate depreciation is stronger. In combination with the additional spending coming from the government, which weakens the exchange rate depreciation, an ambiguity arises in terms of the total e¤ect. With a Figure 11 : In response to a permanent government spending shock, trade costs lead to a less pronounced exchange rate movement for local currency pricing (s = 1) but to a more pronounced movement for low degrees of pricing to market (s = 0 and s = 0:5 in this example).
temporary government spending shock the in ‡uence of the additional spending dominates so that the required exchange rate movement is weaker. With a permanent government spending shock, however, the expenditure-switching e¤ect turns out to dominate so that in total, the required exchange rate movement is stronger than without trade costs. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the exchange rate movements for s = 0 and varying trade cost values. 20 Under producer currency pricing the exchange rate depreciation leads to a positive spillover for Foreign consumption but of course, domestic private consumption is crowded out by government spending such that b C t < 0 < b C t . As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, trade costs soften these consumption movements. With a temporary government spending shock the additional spending dominates the expenditure-switching e¤ect and hence, output increases in both countries and the containment e¤ect channels the bigger proportion of government spending towards the domestic country.
With a permanent government spending shock the expenditure-switching e¤ect dominates and the output movements go into opposite directions. The dominating in ‡uence of the expenditureswitching e¤ect also leads to a current account surplus ( d F t > 0) so that Foreign citizens must decrease their long-run consumption ( b C t+1 < 0) and increase their long-run production ( b h t+1 > 0). All these movements are weakened by trade costs.
To summarize the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 , trade costs decrease the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in response to government spending shocks, except for the special 2 0 Formally, @ (a2=a4) =@ < 0 holds for realistic parameter values. Then @ (a3=a4) =@ > 0 is required for permanent government spending shocks to entail a stronger exchange rate movement. Unless one country is overwhelmingly big (roughly over 98% of world size), this is generally the case. For small this might not necessarily go through, as can be seen from the non-monotonicity with s = 0 and s = 0:5 in Figure 11. case of a permanent shock in combination with a low degree of pricing to market (i.e. small s). Through equation (16) the lower volatility also translates to the real exchange rate. Trade costs tone down the international correlation of consumption, except for short-run consumption under local currency pricing in which case trade costs have no impact. Trade costs always tone down the international correlation of output as well as the adjustment of the current account.
As with monetary shocks, the impact of trade costs is generally biggest when the two countries are of equal size.
Regardless of the degree of pricing to market, Home citizens always su¤er a welfare loss from Home government spending shocks simply because government spending does not enter the utility function, but Foreign citizens always gain. As the containment e¤ect ensures that the government spending is predominantly kept in the domestic country, trade costs narrow to welfare gap between Home and Foreign citizens. As with monetary shocks, Foreign welfare is not a¤ected at all for the limit of ! 1.
D Rebating Trade Costs
The solution method for the rebating extension is exactly the same as the one described in Appendix C. Therefore, only some hints and results are given here.
Governments are able to recuperate a share of the trade costs associated with the shipping of goods into the domestic country. This revenue is then rebated to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Analogous to (10) the amount of the Foreign country's real output being shipped abroad is denoted by z t so that the real quantity of iceberg trade costs incurred by the Home country is z t . Let denote the share of the iceberg trade costs that the government is able to recuperate.
The Home government budget constraint (8) now becomes P t G t + Z t = M t M t 1 + (sp t + (1 s)e t q t )z t Thus, compared to a world with no rebating labor supply is lower whilst consumption is higher.
The expressions for the price indices in (36) and (37) and where all 's in a 1 and a 3 are replaced by e . Note that the equivalent expressions of (52) and (55) 
